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WHEN TERRY MET MIRANDA: TWO
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINES COLLIDE
MARK A. GODSEY*
INTRODUCTIONIN the 1984 case of Berkemer v. McCarty,' the United States
Supreme Court stated that Miranda warnings2 are not required dur-
ing Terry stops3 or other investigatory detentions analogous to Terry
stops. 4 This statement made perfect sense at the time. Legal scholars
knew that Miranda and the Fifth Amendment' were not implicated
until the police placed a suspect in "custody," which the Supreme
Court had defined as when a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed
to a "degree associated with a formal arrest."6 Likewise, at the time
Berkemer was decided, Fourth Amendment7 principles were clear that
investigatory detentions of suspects made without probable cause
under the auspices of Terry had to be brief, less intrusive than a formal
arrest, and "substantially less 'police dominated'" than the type of
police-citizen encounters at issue in Miranda.8 Thus, no crossover be-
* Associate, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Chicago. Panel Attorney, Federal De-
fender Program, Northern District of Illinois. B.S., Northwestern University, 1990;
J.D., The Ohio State University College of Law, 1993. 1 would like to thank Kristin
D. Godsey and Mitch Matorin for their help in preparing this Article.
1. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
2. Although the intricacies of the Miranda doctrine will be developed in part I,
"Miranda warnings" are recitations of a suspect's constitutional rights, including the
right to remain silent and the right to counsel, which must be administered before a
police officer can interrogate a suspect who is in police "custody." See Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see also infra notes 14-64 and accompanying text.
3. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). A Terry stop is a "brief investigatory deten-
tion" discussed infra part II.
4. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440.
5. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases aris-
ing in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger, nor shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law;, nor shall private property be
taken for public use without just compensation.
U.S. Const. amend. V.
6. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam).
7. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or af-
firmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
8. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) (citation omitted).
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tween the two doctrines existed. Because Miranda warnings were not
required until a detention became or resembled an arrest, and a Terry
stop was a Fourth Amendment detention that was substantially less
intrusive than an arrest, Miranda warnings were not required during a
Terry stop.
In a series of cases in the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, the
lower federal courts, without guidance from the Supreme Court, dra-
matically expanded the level of force that police officers may use in
certain Terry encounters.9 Thus, it is no longer uncommon for police
officers executing Terry stops to employ highly intrusive, "arrest-like"
measures of force such as handcuffs or drawn weapons. 10 Under Fifth
Amendment case law, these types of force are often considered to
place a suspect in police "custody" and thereby necessitate Miranda
warnings. 1 As a result, the recent expansion of Terry has, perhaps
unknowingly, caused two important constitutional doctrines to clash.
Many factual scenarios exist where a proper application of Fifth
Amendment case law would mandate that Miranda warnings be ad-
ministered because the suspect is in "custody"; yet, in the same scena-
rio, an application of Fourth Amendment case law and the Berkemer
decision would dictate that Miranda warnings are not necessary be-
cause the encounter is a mere Terry stop.
This catch-22 raises several questions that will have to be answered
by the federal courts: Should Berkemer allow the Fourth Amendment
to, in effect, trump the Fifth Amendment and nullify Miranda, even if
Miranda would be applicable under pure Fifth Amendment analysis?
Is Berkemer distinguishable now that Fourth Amendment law has
changed? Has the expansion of Terry gone too far and confused an
area of law that previously was clear and manageable to police of-
ficers? Should Miranda warnings now be required in some Terry situ-
ations? In 1993, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit was the first court to attempt to answer some of these ques-
tions in United States v. Perdue.2 The Tenth Circuit distinguished
Berkemer and explicitly held that Miranda warnings are mandatory in
some highly intrusive Terry encounters. 3 The Tenth Circuit, however,
had at least two other possible methods of resolving this conflict at its
disposal, and the other federal courts, including the Supreme Court,
will eventually have to decide the controversy for themselves.
This Article explores the conflict created by Berkemer and the re-
cent expansion of Terry and attempts to answer some of the questions
that the federal courts now face. Part I provides a brief overview of
the Miranda doctrine, and answers the question: At what point during
9. See infra notes 98-126 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 98-126 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
12. 8 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1993).
13. Id. at 1465-66.
[Vol. 63
HeinOnline -- 63 Fordham L. Rev. 716 1994-1995
TERRY AND MIRANDA
a police-citizen encounter are Miranda warnings required? Part II ex-
plores the Fourth Amendment and Terry and tracks the changes that
Terry has gone through in recent years. This part also discusses
Terry's relationship to Miranda at various points as Terry has evolved.
Part III outlines the three options that the federal courts may invoke
to resolve this conflict, compares the pros and cons of each option,
and sets forth the author's view of what is the best course for courts to
take in harmonizing several competing interests.
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF MIRANDA AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
The Miranda doctrine is the one element that has remained rela-
tively constant through the years. The Miranda opinion established
the now familiar principle that, before engaging a suspect in "custodial
interrogation,"' 4 law enforcement officials must inform the suspect
that he has a right to remain silent, that his statements may be used
against him at trial, and that he may have retained or appointed coun-
sel present during the interrogation.'" The Miranda safeguards were
designed to counteract the inherently compelling and intimidating
pressures of police custodial interrogation and to create an environ-
ment where a suspect can freely and knowingly invoke his constitu-
tional rights if he so desires.' 6 The Supreme Court employed the
exclusionary rule as a means of deterring police officers from ignoring
the mandates of Miranda: If the police do not disclose to a suspect his
rights before the interrogation begins, the prosecution may not use the
suspect's subsequent incriminating statements against him during its
case-in-chief at trial.17 Because the Miranda warnings are not trig-
gered until a police officer subjects a person to "custodial interroga-
tion," the operative words in evolving Miranda jurisprudence have
become "custody" and "interrogation." Most subsequent interpreta-
tions of Miranda by the Supreme Court and the other federal courts
have simply been attempts to clarify and further define these two
terms.'
14. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
15. Id; see also Office of Legal Policy, Department of Justice, "Truth in Criminal
Justice Series". The Law of Pretrial Interrogation, 22 U. Mich. J.L Ref. 437, 488
(1989) (discussing obligations that Miranda places on police officers); David A. Wol-
fin, Policing the Police: Should Miranda Violations Bear Fruit?, 53 Ohio St. LJ. 805,
806 (1992) (same).
16. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467; see also Wollin, supra note 15, at 806-07 (explaining
that Miranda warnings were designed to counteract compelling pressures of custodial
interrogation).
17. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
18. See Anne Bowen Poulin, The Fourth Amendment Elusive Standards; Elusive
Review, 67 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 127, 138 n.76 (discussing fact that "post-Miranda cases
dwell on the definitions of custody and interrogation"); Richard A. Williamson, The
Virtues (and Limits) of Shared Values: The Fourth Amendment and Miranda's Con-
cept of Custody, 1993 U. l. L. Rev. 379, 380 (same).
1994]
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A. "Custody"
The first definition of "custody" was set forth in Miranda. In that
case, the suspect was arrested at his home, transported to the Phoenix
police station in a cruiser, and then questioned by police officers in an
isolated interrogation room. 19 The suspect signed a written confession
after two hours of interrogation, and the arresting officers later admit-
ted that they did not inform the suspect of his constitutional rights
before they elicited his confession. 0 Holding the confession inadmis-
sible and proffering the two-pronged "custodial interrogation" test as
the method to determine when the prophylactic safeguards must be
administered, the Supreme Court ruled that a person has been taken
into police custody whenever he "has been . . . deprived of his free-
dom of action in any significant way."''2 Because this definition was
vague and provided little guidance to the lower courts, the Supreme
Court attempted to clarify it in subsequent cases.
In California v. Beheler, the Court for the first time appeared to
connect Miranda and the Fifth Amendment to Fourth Amendment
concepts.3 In Beheler, the suspect voluntarily called the police and
informed them that he had aided and abetted a murder.2 4 Later that
day, he voluntarily agreed to accompany the police to the police sta-
tion and submit to questioning, at which time he once again affirmed
that he had been involved in a murder.' Before going to the station,
the police informed him that he was not under arrest, and they did not
administer Miranda warnings." After being convicted, he appealed
all the way to the Supreme Court, arguing that he was in police cus-
tody at the time of the interrogation; therefore, his confession was
admitted into evidence at trial in violation of Miranda. In its holding,
the Court reiterated the relevant language in Miranda, and then stated
that "the ultimate inquiry [when determining whether a suspect has
been placed in custody] is simply whether there is a 'formal arrest or
restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a
formal arrest."2 7 The Court then held that the suspect was not in cus-
tody, and thus no Miranda violation had occurred, because he volun-
tarily cooperated without any police coercion and the police did not
restrain his freedom of action in a manner "associated with formal
19. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491 (1966). Miranda actually consisted
of several consolidated cases raising the same issue, each with slightly different factual
circumstances. Because all of the cases were similar factually, I use only Mr. Mi-
randa's situation for illustrative purposes.
20. Id. at 491-92.
21. Id. at 444.
22. 463 U.S. 1121 (1983) (per curiam).
23. See Williamson, supra note 18, at 381.
24. Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1122.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1125 (citation omitted).
[Vol. 63
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arrest."2 "Arrest," as will be discussed in the next section, is a term
of art which, under technical Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, refers
to the level of physical force that police may use to restrain a suspect
if they have probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed
a crime.29 Thus, Beheler appeared to make the Fifth Amendment par-
allel to the Fourth Amendment-a suspect would not be considered
in "custody," and therefore Miranda would not be triggered, until the
level of police force or intimidation could be considered an arrest for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
The Court's most recent significant pronouncement on the "cus-
tody" definition came in Berkemer v. McCarty,a° which established an
objective test for determining whether a suspect "was subjected to re-
straints comparable to those associated with a formal arrest."'3 1 Ac-
cording to the Berkemer Court, it is irrelevant whether the suspect
personally felt restrained or believed that he was under arrest; rather,
the only relevant inquiry is "how a reasonable man in the suspect's
position would have understood his situation."' 2 In construing these
standards, courts almost universally have held that when police of-
ficers use handcuffs, point their guns at a suspect, or place a suspect in
a cruiser, they have rendered him in "custody" for purposes of
Miranda.33
28. Id. at 1125.
29. See infra part II.
30. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
31. Id. at 441.
32. Id. at 442 (emphasis added).
33. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984) (holding that a suspect
surrounded by police officers and in handcuffs was in custody); United States v. Per-
due, 8 F.3d 1455, 1464-65 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that a suspect questioned at gun-
point was in custody and thus Miranda warnings were required before interrogation);
Fleming v. Collins, 917 F.2d 850, 853 (5th Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. Fazio,
914 F.2d 950, 955 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that a suspect was not in custody because
there was no evidence that he was handcuffed or held at gunpoint); United States v.
Glenna, 878 F.2d 967, 970-71 (7th Cir. 1989) (discussing lower court's finding that a
suspect in handcuffs is "manifestly" in custody, although ultimately holding that no
Miranda violation existed because no interrogation occurred); United States v. Brady,
819 F.2d 884, 887 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that use of handcuffs and pointing guns
placed a suspect in custody), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1068 (1988); United States v. Blum,
614 F.2d 537, 540 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that placing a suspect in a police cruiser
rendered him in custody); United States v. Baumwald, 720 F. Supp. 226, 235 (D. Me.
1989) (holding that a suspect was not in custody in part because officers did not draw
their guns); United States v. Corral-Corral, 702 F. Supp. 1539, 1545 (D. Wyo. 1988)
(holding that placing a suspect in a ditch in handcuffs rendered him in custody), rev'd
on other grounds, 899 F.2d 927 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Guarino, 629 F.
Supp. 320, 324-25 (D. Conn. 1986) (holding that a suspect whose hands were hand-
cuffed behind his back and who was surrounded by armed agents would reasonably
consider himself in custody); see also Daniel Yeager, Rethinking Custodial Interroga-
tion, 28 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1 (1990) (arguing that drawn weapons and handcuffs are
two indicia of actual custody).
1994] 719
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B. "Interrogation"
Once a suspect is in police custody, Miranda warnings are only nec-
essary before the police subject him to "interrogation. '34 Thus, the
second prong of the Miranda inquiry is devoted to determining what
sort of questions constitute interrogation. The Miranda opinion itself
provided little guidance, defining the term simply as "questioning ini-
tiated by law enforcement officers."'35 Subsequent cases have made
clear, however, that many police investigatory tactics that fall short of
direct questioning can be considered tantamount to interrogation.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Rhode Island v. Innis36 provides a
case in point.
In Innis, a police officer was on a routine patrol when he spotted
and arrested a man who had previously been identified as the assailant
in a robbery that was linked to a recent murder. Upon being read
his Miranda rights, the suspect stated that he wanted to speak with a
lawyer.38 En route to the police station, one of the two police officers
accompanying the suspect initiated a conversation with his fellow of-
ficer as they drove past the area where the recent murder had oc-
curred.39 The content of the conversation was that someone had
recently been murdered nearby and that the officers were still search-
ing for the missing gun that they believed had been hidden by the
murderer.4" The officers desperately wanted to find the gun and shells
because a school for handicapped children was located nearby, and
they feared that the children might find the gun and hurt themselves.4'
After one of the officers stated that "it would be too bad if [a little
handicapped girl] . .. pick[ed] up the gun, [and] maybe kill[ed] her-
self,"4 the suspect interrupted the conversation and announced that
he would show the officers where he had hidden the gun.43 He then
led the officers to a place where the gun was hidden under some rocks,
stating that he "wanted to get the gun out of the way because of the
kids in the area in the school."'
The suspect subsequently was convicted of murder based on this
evidence. The verdict was set aside by the Rhode Island Supreme
Court, however, which held that the police officers had "interrogated"
the suspect after he had invoked his right to counsel because their
34. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966).
35. Id. at 444.
36. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
37. Id. at 293-94.
38. Id. at 294.
39. Id. at 294-95.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 295.
43. Id.
44. Id.
[Vol. 63
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conversation had subjected him to "subtle coercion."4 The United
States Supreme Court reinstated the conviction, holding that "subtle
compulsion" is not necessarily equivalent to "interrogation."46 De-
spite its holding, the Court made clear that investigatory tactics that
fall short of direct questioning may still be considered interrogation in
some instances. The Court then proffered the modem definition that
has become boilerplate language in most Miranda cases: "[T]he term
'interrogation' under Miranda refers not only to express questioning,
but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than
those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from
the suspect."'47 The Court was persuaded that interrogation had not
occurred because the officers could not reasonably have anticipated
that their "offhand" remarks would suddenly move the suspect to
make incriminating statements.' The officers were not aware that the
suspect was "peculiarly susceptible to an appeal to his conscience con-
ceming the safety of handicapped children."4 9 Nor did they know that
the suspect "was unusually disoriented or upset at the time of his
arrest.''50 Therefore, the conversation was not behavior that they
should have known was "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response." 51
The facts of Brewer v. WilliamIs52 offer a good backdrop against
which to test the boundaries of the Innis standard. 53 In Brewer, a sus-
pect who had been arrested for the abduction and possible murder of
a ten-year-old girl was being transported by police from Davenport,
Iowa, to Des Moines, where the abduction occurred.5s Prior to leav-
ing with the police officers, the suspect's attorney advised him not to
make any statements to the police officers. 55 The suspect's attorney
also obtained an agreement from the officers that they would not in-
terrogate him during the drive.56
45. Id. at 296 (citing State v. Innis, 391 A.2d 1158 (R.I. 1978)).
46. Id. at 303.
47. Id. at 301 (footnote omitted).
48. Id. at 303.
49. Id. at 302.
50. Id. at 303.
51. Id. at 301.
52. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
53. The Brewer case involved the question of whether the suspect was interro-
gated in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, not his Fifth Amendment
Miranda rights. Id at 397-98. Although the Supreme Court later stated in its Innis
opinion that the definitions of "interrogation" in the Sixth Amendment and Fifth
Amendment contexts are not necessarily interchangeable, Rhode Island v. Innis, 446
U.S. 291, 300 n.4 (1980), the Brewer opinion nevertheless has become a guidepost in
the Fifth Amendment context, and its facts are particularly good for a discussion of
the Innis standard.
54. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 391.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 392.
1994]
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During the 160-mile trip to Des Moines, though, one of the officers,
who knew that the suspect was a former mental patient and was
deeply religious, initiated the following monologue:
I want to give you something to think about while we're traveling
down the road.... Number one, I want you to observe the weather
conditions, it's raining, it's sleeting, it's freezing, driving is very
treacherous, visibility is poor, it's going to be dark early this eve-
ning. They are predicting several inches of snow for tonight, and I
feel that you yourself are the only person that knows where this
little girl's body is, that you yourself have only been there once, and
if you get a snow on top of it you yourself may be unable to find it.
And, since we will be going right past the area on the way into Des
Moines, I feel that we could stop and locate the body, that the par-
ents of this little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for the
little girl who was snatched away from them on Christmas [E]ve and
murdered. And I feel we should stop and locate it on the way in
rather than waiting until morning and trying to come back out after
a snow storm and possibly not being able to find it at all. 7
The suspect then asked the officer why he thought that the girl's
body lay somewhere on the route to Des Moines, and the officer
promptly responded that he knew the body was near the town of
Mitchellville, although the officer in reality possessed no such knowl-
edge. The officer stated: "I do not want you to answer me. I don't
want to discuss it any further. Just think about it as we're riding down
the road."58 Shortly before the cruiser reached the town of Mitch-
ellville, the suspect informed the officers that he would direct them to
the girl's body. The officers soon found the body in the place where
the suspect claimed he had left it. 9 Based on the evidence elicited by
the officer's "Christian burial speech," the suspect was convicted of
first-degree murder.60
Without significant discussion, the Supreme Court overturned the
conviction, holding that the suspect had been interrogated in violation
of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel-even though no direct
questioning occurred and the police officer had requested that the sus-
pect not respond. In so holding, the Court did not elaborate on its
operative definition of interrogation, but simply indicated in a con-
clusory manner that it had occurred. 6' Again, the Court has empha-
sized that the definition of interrogation in the Sixth Amendment and
Fifth Amendment contexts are not necessarily the same,62 and be-
cause Brewer is a Sixth Amendment case, it provides no precedential
value towards the Innis standard. But the facts of Brewer significantly
57. Id. at 392-93.
58. Id. at 393.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 394 (citing State v. Williams, 182 N.W.2d 396, 402 (Iowa 1970)).
61. Id. at 400.
62. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 n.4 (1980).
[Vol. 63
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depart from the facts of Innis in such a way that, if it had addressed
the issue, the Court in Brewer could have found that interrogation had
occurred for purposes of the Fifth Amendment and Miranda. Specifi-
cally, in Brewer the police officer spoke directly to the suspect, while
in Innis the police officers merely spoke between themselves. Also, in
Brewer the officer knew that the suspect was deeply religious and
might be susceptible to the "Christian burial speech," while in Innis
the Court found that the officers had no similar knowledge of the sus-
pect's weaknesses. With these differences, the officer in Brewer ar-
guably should have known that his "Christian burial speech" was
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, and was, there-
fore, tantamount to interrogation under the Fifth Amendment.
To summarize the Miranda doctrine, the prophylactic safeguards
are not required until the police engage a suspect in "custodial inter-
rogation." "Custody" refers to the level of police force or intimida-
tion that restricts a suspect's freedom of action in a "significant way,"
and to a "degree associated with formal arrest."' 3 This determination
is objective; that is, courts attempt to measure how a reasonable per-
son in the suspect's position would have felt. "Interrogation" is direct
questioning or any other words or actions by the police that they
should know are "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response
from the suspect."'
II. THE EVOLUTION OF TERRY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP THROUGH
TIME WITH MRANDA
Terry v. Ohio65 established the principle that a police officer may
use a limited amount of force' to "seize" a person, classified by the
Court as a "brief investigatory detention," without probable cause
that the person has committed or is in the process of committing a
crime.67 To effectuate a brief investigatory detention, which has be-
come known as a "Terry stop," an officer must have "reasonable sus-
picion" that criminal activity is afoot.68 "Reasonable suspicion" is a
quantum of knowledge and suspicion that is less than "probable
63. See supra notes 5, 19-33 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 47, 51 and accompanying text.
65. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
66. The word "force" refers to police conduct that intrudes on a person's privacy
or freedom, such as touching, frisking, demanding that the person "freeze" and raise
his arms, handcuffing, drawing weapons, pointing weapons, placing the person in a
police cruiser, making the person lie on the ground, etc. The question of how much
and what types of force police may use during a Terry stop, as Terry has changed
through the years, is the central theme of this section of the Article.
67. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
68. Id at 30. For a general overview of the Terry doctrine, see George E. Dix,
Nonarrest Investigatory Detentions in Search and Seizure Law, 1985 Duke L.J. 849,
855-57; Gregory H. Williams, The Supreme Court and Broken Promises: The Gradual
But Continual Erosion of Terry v. Ohio, 34 How. LJ. 567 (1991); Karen S. Kovach,
Note, Search and Seizure: Sliding Scale Used to Determine Reasonableness Eroded
1994]
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cause," the level of suspicion required to make a full-scale Fourth
Amendment arrest.69 If, during a Terry stop, an officer uses a level of
force that exceeds the maximum level permissible for such an encoun-
ter, the detention becomes an "arrest" that is unlawful unless the of-
ficer not only had reasonable suspicion but also had probable cause.70
This imaginary line, representing the amount of force where a Terry
stop becomes an arrest, has changed positions through the years as the
federal courts have expanded Terry.7
A. The Amount of Force Permissible: Early Terry
The Terry opinion clearly establishes that Terry stops may involve
only a minimal show of force. In that case, a police officer, who had
reasonable suspicion (but not probable cause) that an armed robbery
was about to take place, approached the suspects on a city sidewalk,
identified himself as a police officer, and asked for their names. When
one of the suspects, Mr. Terry, mumbled inaudibly in response, the
officer grabbed him, spun him around, and proceeded to "pat down"
the outside of his clothing. Upon feeling a gun in the pocket of Terry's
coat, he ordered the suspects to enter a nearby store and place their
hands high against the wall. On the way into the store, the officer
removed Terry's coat containing the pistol. The officer then frisked
the other two men and found a revolver on one of them. The officer
later testified at the suppression hearing that he patted down their
Probable Cause in United States v. Chaidez, 919 F.2d 1193 (7th Cir. 1990), 60 U. Cin.
L. Rev. 857, 860-63 (1992).
69. Police officers have "reasonable suspicion" when they can point to "specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant [an] intrusion." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). In contrast,
"[pirobable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances within [the arresting of-
ficers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are]
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an
offense has been or is being committed." Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313
(1959) (citation and internal quotation omitted); see generally David A. Harris, Fac-
tors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69
Ind. L.J. 659 (1994) (discussing the difference between "reasonable suspicion" and
"probable cause"). The difference between reasonable suspicion and probable cause,
as with many other aspects of the Terry doctrine, is irrelevant for purposes of this
Article.
70. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82 (1975). As one com-
mentator describes:
A forcible detention that exceeds what reasonably can be characterized as a
"temporary" detention-that is, a detention that lasts longer than is neces-
sary to effectuate the purposes of the seizure or one in which the investiga-
tive techniques employed during the detention are not the 'least intrusive'
means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officers' suspicions in a
short period of time-constitutes an arrest and must be supported by prob-
able cause.
Williamson, supra note 18, at 383.
71. United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1464 (10th Cir. 1993) (discussing the
expansion of Terry in the federal courts).
[Vol. 63
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clothing only to determine whether they carried weapons, and he did
not put his hands inside their clothing until after he felt a gun.12
After being found guilty of carrying concealed weapons, Terry ap-
pealed, contending that the frisk was a Fourth Amendment arrest that
was not supported by probable cause. The Supreme Court affirmed
the conviction and, in the process, carved out a new category of police
"seizures," which could be made on reasonable suspicion rather than
probable cause. The Court made clear, however, that because these
Terry stops required a quantum of suspicion less than probable cause
and thus represented a greater threat to the public's privacy, they had
to be substantially less intrusive than full-scale arrests. Emphasizing
that the Terry exception to the probable cause requirement must be
"narrowly drawn,"73 the Court strictly confined its holding to author-
ize only a stop and a "carefully limited search of the outer clothing of
[a suspect] in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to
assault" an officer or passerby.74 In street vernacular, this was called a
"stop-and-frisk."
Through the 1970s, most federal courts agreed that the Terry excep-
tion was very limited in terms of permissible force and that handcuffs,
displays of weapons, time-consuming detentions, the placing of sus-
pects in police cars, and other such intrusions that exceeded a mere
stop-and-frisk were measures of force inappropriate for Terry stops.76
For example, in 1974 in United States v. StricklerT' the Ninth Circuit
held that the police had surpassed the bounds of a Terry stop when
they surrounded a suspect's car and, with weapons drawn, ordered the
occupants of the car to raise their hands above their heads.18 The
court stated: "[W]e simply cannot equate an armed approach to a
surrounded vehicle whose occupants have been commanded to raise
their hands" with a brief and nonintrusive Terry stop.7 9 Similarly, the
Tenth Circuit in 1978 held in United States v. McLemore ° that an
otherwise valid Terry stop was converted into an arrest when the po-
lice ordered a suspect at gunpoint to put down the box he was holding,
step over to a nearby plane, and place his hands against the side of the
plane.81 These two cases are typical of Terry-type cases through the
1970s when courts almost uniformly agreed that any police conduct
72. Terry, 392 U.S. at 7.
73. Id at 27.
74. Id at 30.
75. Id at 10.
76. United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1464 (10th Cir. 1993) (discussing the
recent "multifaceted expansion of Terry" to include indicia of force such as handcuffs
and weapons which previously had been considered appropriate only for arrests); see
also infra note 82.
77. 490 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1974).
78. Id at 380.
79. Id
80. 573 F.2d 1154 (10th Cir. 1978).
81. Id at 1157.
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that restricted a suspect's "liberty of movement" beyond a stop-and-
frisk immediately elevated a Terry encounter to an arrest.82 Indeed,
one federal court even held that merely commanding a suspect "not to
move" and to "get up against the wall" exceeded the narrowly defined
limits of Terry-even though the arresting officers apparently did not
draw their guns, touch the suspect, or use any physical force.8 3
During this era the federal courts were beginning to equate the
Fourth Amendment concept of "arrest" with the Miranda concept of
"custody." ' In other words, courts believed that at the moment the
amount of force used by police officers turned a Terry stop into a
Fourth Amendment arrest, the suspect was in custody under the Fifth
Amendment, and Miranda warnings became necessary.8 5 As long as
the level of force remained in the Terry realm, however, the suspect
was not in custody, and Miranda warnings were not required.86 Thus,
it came as no surprise in 1984 when the Berkemer Court stated that
Miranda warnings are not applicable to Terry stops.87 In Berkemer,
the suspect, Mr. Berkemer, was pulled over on an interstate highway"
for weaving in and out of a traffic lane. After approaching the vehicle,
the officer asked Berkemer to get out of his car. The officer then
noticed that Berkemer was having difficulty standing and asked him
whether he had been using any intoxicants-a question that undoubt-
82. See, e.g., United States v. Strickler, 490 F.2d 378, 380 (9th Cir. 1974) ("The
restriction of Strickler's 'liberty of movement' was complete when he was encircled by
police and confronted with official orders made at gunpoint.") (citations omitted);
Moran v. United States, 404 F.2d 663, 666 (10th Cir. 1968) ("If a suspect is interrupted
and his liberty of movement restricted by the arresting officers, then [an] arrest is
complete."); see also United States v. O'Looney, 544 F.2d 385, 388 (9th Cir.) (holding
that a Terry stop was valid in part because "[t]here were no drawn weapons, no evi-
dence of handcuffs, no overt force and no threats"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1023 (1976);
United States v. Anderson, 533 F.2d 1210, 1213-14 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (applying the
probable cause standard to an encounter where police told a suspect to freeze and
placed him in handcuffs); United States v. Whitlock, 418 F. Supp. 138, 142-43 (E.D.
Mich. 1976) (finding that handcuffs and pointed guns turned detention into arrest),
aff'd, 556 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1977). But cf United States v. Richards, 500 F.2d 1025,
1028-29 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that use of a pointed gun was permissible in a Terry
stop where the officer first requested information without pointing the gun, and some
show of force was the only way to stop the fleeing suspect from escaping), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 924 (1975).
83. Moran, 404 F.2d at 666.
84. For example, in United States v. White, 648 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 924 (1981), the D.C. Circuit expressly equated the two terms, holding that
"[w]hether there has been an arrest turns on whether there has been an imposition of
custody." Id. at 33-34 (emphasis added) (citing Bailey v. United States, 389 F.2d 305,
314 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Leventhal, J., concurring)). Similarly, in United States v. Perez-
Esparza, 609 F.2d 1284 (9th Cir. 1979), the Ninth Circuit substituted the Fifth Amend-
ment phrase "custodial interrogation" for the Fourth Amendment term "arrest,"
holding that "[tihe fundamental issue here is the line of demarcation between a Terry
'stop' requiring only reasonable suspicion, and... 'custodial interrogation' ... requir-
ing probable cause." Id. at 1287 n.2.
85. See supra notes 22-29, 84 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 22-29, 84 and accompanying text.
87. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984).
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edly was "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response."as
Berkemer promptly replied that "he had consumed two beers and had
smoked several joints of marijuana a short time before." 9
After being convicted of driving under the influence of drugs,
Berkemer appealed on Fifth Amendment grounds, claiming that he
had been interrogated while in police custody without first having
been read his Miranda rights. 0 The Supreme Court considered two
facts to be of particular importance:
First, detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presump-
tively temporary and brief. The vast majority of roadside deten-
tions last only a few minutes. A motorist's expectations, when he
sees a policeman's light flashing behind him, are that he will be
obliged to spend a short period of time answering questions and
waiting while the officer checks his license and registration, that he
may then be given a citation, but that in the end he will most likely
be allowed to continue on his way.91
Second, the Court was compelled by the fact that traffic stops usually
occur in public where the scrutiny of passersby reduces the chance
that police officers will use illegitimate means to elicit incriminating
statements. 92 Noting that "the atmosphere surrounding an ordinary
traffic stop is substantially less 'police dominated' than that surround-
ing the kinds of interrogation at issue in Miranda itself,"93 the Court
analogized a traffic stop to a Terry stop.94 It then summarized the
Terry doctrine in a manner consistent with views of the time-Terry
stops were brief, limited, and noncoercive. s Accordingly, the Court
held:
The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this
sort explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that
Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda. The similarly
noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that
persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not "in cus-
tody" for the purposes of Miranda.9 6
The message was clear. Because Terry stops were minor intrusions
that did not threaten a suspect's ability to invoke his constitutional
rights or place him in "custody," Miranda was simply inapplicable.
The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the admission of Berkemer's
statements made during the traffic stop. This view accorded with the
88. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (footnote omitted).
89. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 423.
90. Id. at 424-25.
91. Id. at 437.
92. Id. at 438.
93. Id. at 438-39 (citation omitted).
94. Id. at 439.
95. Id. at 439-40.
96. Id. at 440.
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opinions of most of the lower federal courts that considered the issue
during the era preceding Terry's expansion. 7
B. The Amount of Force Permissible: The Recent Expansion
of Terry
Beginning around the time that the Berkemer decision was handed
down, and gaining steam in the early 1990s, the federal courts dramat-
ically expanded the level of force permissible during Terry stops.98
This expansion has not been uniform or clean-cut, and has left Terry
jurisprudence in a state of semi-confusion. Although it is difficult to
succinctly summarize where this trend has left the line that divides a
Terry stop from an arrest, many highly intrusive forms of force such as
handcuffs, pointed guns, and the placing of suspects in cruisers-
measures of force that used to be prohibited during Terry stops-are
now routine.99
At least nine of the federal courts of appeals have now authorized
the use of handcuffs during Terry stops." The Seventh Circuit deci-
sion in United States v. Tilmon"1° is illustrative. In Tilmon, police of-
ficers had reasonable suspicion (but not probable cause), premised on
97. See, e.g., United States v. McGauley, 786 F.2d 888, 890-91 (8th Cir. 1986)
(holding that no Miranda warnings were necessary for persons detained for a Terry
stop); United States v. Streifel, 781 F.2d 953, 959 (1st Cir. 1986) (same); United States
v. Jones, 543 F.2d 1171, 1173 (5th Cir. 1976) (stating that Miranda warnings are not
necessary during Terry-type traffic stops), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 957 (1977); United
States v. Hickman, 523 F.2d 323, 326-27 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that questioning dur-
ing a Terry stop did not require Miranda warnings), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976).
98. United States v. Tilmon, 19 F.3d 1221, 1224 (7th Cir. 1994) ("In the recent
past, the... 'permissible scope of the intrusion [under the Terry doctrine has] ex-
panded beyond [its] original contours.' ") (quoting United States v. Chaidez, 919 F.2d
1193, 1198 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2861 (1991)); United States v. Per-
due, 8 F.3d 1455, 1464 (10th Cir. 1993) (discussing this trend); Williams, supra note 68
(discussing the expansion of Terry); see also infra notes 100-28.
99. See infra notes 100-28.
100. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1095 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that
handcuffing does not necessarily turn a stop into an arrest); United States v. Merkley,
988 F.2d 1062, 1064 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that handcuffing is reasonable without
probable cause where there is a possibility of danger); United States v. Saffeels, 982
F.2d 1199, 1206 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding handcuffing to be a reasonable precaution
during an investigative stop), vacated on other grounds, 114 S. Ct. 41 (1993); United
States v. Williams, No. 91-3097, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 25808 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 6, 1992)
(unpublished opinion); United States v. Esieke, 940 F.2d 29,36 (2d Cir.) (holding that
handcuffs and leg irons during border detention does not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 610 (1991); United States v. Crittendon, 883 F.2d 326,
329 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding handcuffing reasonable during a stop to protect the of-
ficer and to prevent flight); United States v. Hemphill, 767 F.2d 922 (6th Cir.) (hold-
ing that handcuffing of suspects known to be armed and dangerous did not convert a
stop into an arrest), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 982 (1985); United States v. Kapperman,
764 F.2d 786, 790 n.4 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that handcuffing does not automati-
cally convert a Terry stop into a de facto arrest); United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701,
709 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that handcuffing where a suspect disobeyed an order to
raise his hands and made hand movements did not convert a stop into an arrest).
101. 19 F.3d 1221 (7th Cir. 1994).
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information received from police radio dispatches, to stop Mr.
Tilmon's car to investigate a bank robbery that had just occurred. Af-
ter pulling him over, the officers informed Tilmon over a loudspeaker
that he should get out of his car with his hands up and lie face down
on the shoulder of the road. He immediately complied. Several po-
lice cruisers were then strategically situated around Tilmon's automo-
bile, effectively blocking it in. After Tilmon was in the lying-prone
position, several officers approached him with weapons drawn (some
guns were pointed at Tilmon while others were pointed at his car),
handcuffed him, and placed him in one of the police cruisers.lca
In trying to determine whether this show of force was within the
permissible bounds of a Terry stop, the Seventh Circuit began its anal-
ysis by noting that "[flor better or for worse," Terry had expanded
beyond its "original contours" in the recent past.10 3 The court also
stated that, because the distinction between a Terry stop and a [de
facto] arrest is "subtle" and "perhaps tenuous," there is no "litmus-
paper test for determining when a seizure exceeds the bounds of [a
Terry] stop."'" Then, without significant discussion, the court held
that the entire seizure, including the use of handcuffs, was reason-
able."0 In this respect, the court merely stated: "Neither does hand-
cuffing in all circumstances transform a stop into an arrest. In fact,
handcuffing-once [considered] highly problematic-is becoming
quite acceptable in the context of a Terry analysis."' 6
Similarly, brandishing weapons-and even holding suspects at gun-
point-have become commonplace during Terry stops. At least six
circuits have approved such shows of force in recent years.Y07 In
Tilmon, the police officers not only pointed guns at the suspect as they
approached him, but they placed a shotgun against his head while they
102. Id. at 1223.
103. Id. at 1224.
104. Id. (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 506 (1983)).
105. Id. at 1226.
106. Id. at 1228 (footnote omitted).
107. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 899 F.2d 833, 838-89 (9th Cir. 1990) (hold-
ing that forcing the defendant out of his vehicle at gunpoint "did not convert the
investigative stop into an arrest"), cerL denied, 498 U.S. 1024 (1991); United States v.
Taylor, 857 F.2d 210, 214 (4th Cir. 1988) (explaining that forcing the defendant out of
his vehicle at gunpoint was a "valid precautionary measure designed to afford a de-
gree of protection to the investigating officer"); United States v. Serna-Barreto, 842
F.2d 965, 967-68 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that an officer acted reasonably in pointing
his gun at the defendant during a stop); United States v. Jones, 759 F.2d 633, 638-41
(8th Cir.) (holding that officers' removal of their guns from their holsters was reason-
able), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 837 (1985); United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1273
(10th Cir. 1982) (noting that the police were "justified in holding shotguns on the
suspects during the course of the stop"), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 916 (1983); United
States v. Jackson, 652 F.2d 244,249 (2d Cir.) (holding that it was not unreasonable for
a police officer to draw his gun when he approached a vehicle whose driver was sus-
pected to be an escaped and armed bank robber), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 1057 (1981).
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handcuffed him and removed him to a cruiser.10 8 In upholding this
conduct as appropriate for a Terry stop, the Seventh Circuit stated:
Although we are troubled by the thought of allowing policemen to
stop people at the point of a gun when probable cause to arrest is
lacking, we are unwilling to hold that an investigative stop is never
lawful when it can be effectuated safely only in that manner. It is
not nice to have a gun pointed at you by a policeman but it is worse
to have a gun pointed at you by a criminal, so there is a complex
tradeoff involved in any proposal to reduce (or increase) the per-
missible scope of [Terry] stops.1' 9
In United States v. Hardnett,"0 the Sixth Circuit faced a similar
question. In that case, police officers effectuated a Terry stop by ap-
proaching Mr. Hardnett's car with their guns drawn and ordering him
and the other passengers out of the car at gunpoint.' Hardnett
claimed that the highly intrusive use of guns elevated the stop to an
arrest unsupported by probable cause. In affirming the district court's
denial of his suppression motion, the Sixth Circuit held:
The question of whether an investigative stop crosses the line and
becomes an arrest has spawned much judicial discussion .... Look-
ing at all the circumstances surrounding the seizure of Hardnett, we
do not find that the officers' conduct was so intrusive as to consti-
tute an arrest. We recognize that the officers' show of force-ap-
proaching Hardnett's car with their guns drawn and ordering the
occupants out of the car at gunpoint-was highly intrusive and
under some circumstances would certainly be tantamount to an
arrest. However, the mere use or display of force in making a stop
will not necessarily convert a stop into an arrest. Where the display
or use of arms is viewed as "reasonably necessary for the protection
of the officers," the courts have generally upheld investigative stops
made at gunpoint. That is, if the surrounding circumstances give
rise to a justifiable fear for personal safety, a seizure effectuated
with weapons drawn may properly be considered an investigative
stop.
We believe that the use of arms in the present case was reason-
ably necessary under the circumstances. The officers were acting in
a situation which justified a fear for personal safety. The officers
had been told ... that the occupants of the car ... were armed.
Therefore, when the officers approached the car, it was reasonable
for them to display their weapons for their own protection. Under
these circumstances, the use of arms did not convert the ... stop
into an arrest." 2
108. United States v. Tilmon, 19 F.3d 1221, 1223 (7th Cir. 1994).
109. Id. at 1227 (citing United States v. Serna-Barreto, 842 F.2d 965, 968 (7th Cir.
1988)).
110. 804 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1986), cert.denied, 479 U.S. 1097 (1987).
111. Id. at 355.
112. Id. at 356-57 (citations omitted).
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The Sixth Circuit's analysis in Hardnett is a perfect example of what
I will call the "two-tiered" model, the model that several circuits have
adopted when expanding Terry. Under this approach, if an officer
does not have a reasonable belief that he may be harmed when he
approaches a suspect, traditional Terry analysis applies and the use of
handcuffs and weapons is unlawful. If the officer reasonably believes
that the suspect is armed and dangerous, however, he may use a
heightened level of force that includes weapons and handcuffs to neu-
tralize the suspect before the investigation begins. Thus, in jurisdic-
tions that take this approach, two types of Terry stops exist depending
on how dangerous the situation appears to the officer. In Hardnett,
the Sixth Circuit recognized that the officers' use of guns could have
elevated the stop into an unlawful arrest if the circumstances had been
different;"13 it was the sole fact that the officers had been informed
over the police dispatch that the suspects were armed and dangerous
that compelled the court's conclusion that the use of guns was
reasonable." 4
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit adopted the two-tiered model in United
States v. Perdue.1" 5 In approving the officers' display of guns during a
Terry stop, the court stated:
It was not unreasonable under the circumstances for the officers to
execute the Terry stop with their weapons drawn. While Terry stops
generally must be fairly nonintrusive, officers may take necessary
steps to protect themselves if the circumstances reasonably warrant
such measures. "[T]he use of guns in connection with a stop is per-
missible where the police reasonably believe [the weapons] are nec-
essary for their protection. ' 116
The Tenth Circuit went on to approve the officers' placing of Mr. Per-
due in the lying-prone position at gunpoint, stating:
We believe that the officers were also justified in ordering Mr. Per-
due out of the car and onto the ground as a means of neutralizing
the potential danger. Directing the suspect to lie on the ground pro-
vided the officers with a better view of the suspect and prevented
him from obtaining weapons which might have been in the car or on
his person. As discussed earlier, the officers had reason to be con-
cerned for their safety and thus could take reasonable steps to pro-
tect themselves. 1"
7
The Tenth Circuit's summary in Perdue clearly embraced the two-
tiered model:
113. Id. at 357.
114. Id.
115. 8 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1993). The facts of Perdue are discussed infra notes 131-
36 and accompanying text.
116. Id. at 1462 (quoting United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1273 (10th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 916 (1983)).
117. Id at 1463 (citations omitted).
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In short, the officers conducted a reasonable Terry stop. Although
bordering on an illegal arrest, the precautionary measures of force
employed by the officers were reasonable under the circum-
stances.... [However,] the force used against Mr. Perdue would
have constituted an arrest were it not for the fact that the officers
had knowledge that Mr. Perdue could be armed and dangerous.118
In addition to the Sixth and Tenth Circuits, the Seventh,119 Ninth,120
and D.C.121 Circuits have endorsed some form of the two-tiered ap-
proach. The Second Circuit, on the other hand, recently adopted a
multifactor test to distinguish Terry stops from arrests.1 22 This test
considers the amount of force used by the police, the need for such
force, the extent to which the suspect's freedom was restrained, the
number of officers involved in the detention, whether the officers had
knowledge that the suspect was armed, the duration of the detention,
the physical treatment of the suspect, and whether handcuffs were
employed.123
In sum, while it is clear that the Terry stop has expanded far beyond
its original contours, no universal, disciplined method exists for mea-
suring when such a stop is converted into an arrest. Even courts that
have adopted some form of the two-tiered model differ in regard to
how narrowly they limit the circumstances under which highly intru-
sive, "arrest-like" Terry stops are lawful. For example, the Tenth Cir-
cuit has made clear that officers may use handcuffs and weapons
during a Terry stop only if they have reasonable suspicion that the
suspect is armed and dangerous. 24 Under Tenth Circuit case law,
therefore, the prosecution has the burden of submitting sufficient evi-
dence to support a finding that the officers were reasonably justified
in fearing an armed attack; if such evidence is not submitted, then
traditional Terry analysis applies and arrest-like measures of force,
such as handcuffs and drawn weapons, are unlawful.'25 The Seventh
Circuit, on the other hand, recently authorized the use of handcuffs
during a Terry stop in a case in which the officers had absolutely no
118. Id. at 1463-65.
119. United States v. Tilmon, 19 F.3d 1221, 1226 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that of-
ficers may use heightened force during Terry stops if "circumstances give rise to a
justifiable fear for personal safety").
120. United States v. Greene, 783 F.2d 1364, 1367-68 (9th Cir.) (holding that of-
ficers may use force during Terry stops, such as drawn guns, if they reasonably fear for
their safety), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1185 (1986).
121. United States v. White, 648 F.2d 29, 34-35 (D.C. Cir.) (allowing display of
weapons if the suspect poses a threat to the officers), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 924 (1981).
122. United States v. Perea, 986 F.2d 633, 645 (2d Cir. 1993) (adopting the mul-
tifactor test).
123. Id. at 645.
124. United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1462-65 (10th Cir. 1993).
125. United States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1052-53 (10th Cir. 1994).
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knowledge or reasonable suspicion that the suspects were armed and
dangerous.1'
The bottom line is that, despite the inconsistencies and confusion
that pervade modern Terry analysis, Terry stops-as a whole-have
become much more intrusive than they were just a few years ago. It is
commonplace for these investigatory detentions to involve handcuffs,
drawn weapons, the lying-prone position, the removing of suspects to
police cruisers, and other forms of force that used to be appropriate
only for full-scale arrests. Thus, with its recent expansion, Terry's con-
ffict with the Miranda doctrine is clear. Under pure Miranda jurispru-
dence, warnings are required whenever a suspect is interrogated in
police "custody."' 27 The use of handcuffs, drawn weapons, and the
placing of suspects in cruisers are all generally considered to render a
suspect in "custody," thereby necessitating Miranda warnings.'28 On
the other hand, Terry stops now often involve these same indicia of
force, but the law has been clear and well-settled that Miranda warn-
ings are not required during Terry stops. Which rule controls now that
the recent expansion of Terry has changed the dynamics of the
equation?
III. THREE OPTIONS
The value of any judicially imposed rule of criminal procedure can
be measured by balancing two countervailing factors: 1) the extent to
which the rule protects the privacy interests and civil liberties embod-
ied in the Bill of Rights; and 2) the extent to which, on the other hand,
the rule frustrates or undermines legitimate law enforcement ef-
forts.' 29 A third theme that resonates through criminal procedure ju-
risprudence is the simplicity of the rule; that is, courts ask whether
police officers could reasonably be expected to understand the rule
and apply it accurately and consistently in the heat of the moment)3
Thus, along with other variables, such as the extent to which it accu-
126. United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1095-96 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 733 (1994).
127. See supra notes 19-33 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 19-33 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 441 (1984) (discussing the bal-
ance between privacy interests and law enforcement efforts); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 24 (1968) (same); see also Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction
149-204 (1968) (discussing countervailing factors in criminal procedure jurispru-
dence); John Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or a Third "Model" of the
Criminal Process, 79 Yale LJ. 359 (1970) (same).
130. See Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 227 (1984) (discussing the Supreme Court's trend toward "bright-line"
criminal procedure rules); Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect
World. On Drawing "Bright Lines" and "Good Faith", 43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 307 (1982)
(same); see also Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 431-32 (discussing the need to avoid "Byzan-
tine" rules); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979) (discussing the need
for simplicity).
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rately follows precedent, each of the three options that follow can be
measured in terms of: 1) how well it protects civil liberties and en-
forces the Constitution; 2) how effectively it does so without substan-
tially undermining law enforcement efforts; and 3) whether it avoids
extreme complexity so that police officers can realistically be expected
to apply it accurately in real world situations.
A. Option One: Miranda Inapplicable to All Terry Encounters
Although its decision was ultimately reversed by the Tenth Circuit,
the United States District Court for the District of Kansas held in
United States v. Perdue that Miranda warnings are not required even
during the newly created, "arrest-like" Terry stops. 3' This was a case
of first impression because even though numerous courts in the past
had held that Miranda warnings are not implicated during Terry stops,
no court had yet addressed that issue specifically in light of the recent
expansion of Terry.'3 2 Even though the district court's decision was
reversed in pertinent part by the Tenth Circuit, which held that Mi-
randa warnings can be implicated in some highly intrusive Terry situa-
tions, other federal courts that face the issue may consider the district
court's analysis in Perdue a viable option. In Perdue, police officers
executed a search warrant at a rural location in Kansas after aerial
surveillance revealed that marijuana was being grown on the property.
Two helicopters, several police cruisers, and more than twenty officers
were involved in the search. The officers not only found marijuana,
but they also discovered loaded weapons in a shed on the property.
The information concerning the weapons was transmitted by radio to
two officers stationed at the outside perimeter of the property next to
a dirt road that led to the area where the search was being conducted.
After receiving this information, the two officers witnessed a car ap-
proaching them on the dirt road. They became suspicious; because the
location was so remote, it was reasonable to assume that the occu-
pants of the car might be visiting the property under investigation.
The two officers became even more suspicious when the driver of the
car suddenly turned his car around and attempted to leave after the
swarm of officers and helicopters surrounding the shed came into his
line of vision.'33
The two officers then quickly positioned themselves on the dirt
road, with their guns drawn and aimed at the occupants of the car, in
an attempt to block the car from leaving the property. The car
promptly stopped, and the officers then ordered the two passengers,
131. United States v. Perdue, No. 91-40052-01, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8508, at *5-7
(D. Kan. May 1, 1992) (unpublished), rev'd in part, 8 F.3d 1455, 1461 (10th Cir. 1993).
132. See Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1461 (pointing out that the Perdue case raised novel and
"unique questions concerning the subtle interplay between Terry [and] Miranda" after
the expansion of Terry).
133. Id. at 1458.
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Mr. Perdue and his fiancee, at gunpoint to exit the car with their
hands up and to lie face down on the dirt road. Perdue immediately
complied, but his fiancee could not because she was nearly nine
months pregnant. One of the officers stood over Perdue with his gun
drawn while Perdue was lying face down in the dirt and asked him
what he was doing on the property. Perdue responded that he was
there to "check on his stuff."' 4 The officer asked, "What stuff?" and
Perdue conveniently replied: "The marijuana that I know that you
guys found in the shed.' 1 35 The officer then asked whose marijuana it
was, and Perdue repeated that it was his and his fiancee's. It was not
until after this interview was completed that the officers read Perdue
his Miranda rights.136
At trial, Perdue moved to suppress the statements he made while
lying on the dirt road, contending that they were elicited during custo-
dial interrogation without the safeguards required by Miranda v. Ari-
zona.137 In holding the confession admissible, the district court began
by determining that the officers had properly executed a valid Terry
stop.138 The court found that the officers had reasonable suspicion
based on the location and movements of the automobile, and that,
consonant with the recent expansion of Terry, the pointing of guns and
other such shows of force did not elevate the stop into a Fourth
Amendment arrest, especially since the officers had specific knowl-
edge that the owners of the marijuana could be armed and danger-
ous.
139 The court held, without significant discussion, that no violation
of Miranda occurred because the encounter was a mere Terry stop and
not an arrest. 4 The district court did not perform a separate Mi-
randa inquiry to determine whether Perdue was in "custody" or
whether he had been "interrogated," apparently finding it unneces-
sary to engage in such analyses once a determination has been made
that the encounter was a mere Terry stop. Yet, as the Tenth Circuit
later pointed out, one cannot seriously dispute the fact that under
pure Fifth Amendment and Miranda case law, Perdue was in police
custody while lying on the ground at gunpoint, and the questions
asked him amounted to interrogation because they were "reasonably
134. Id. at 1459.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
138. United States v. Perdue, No. 91-40052-01, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8508, at *5-7
(D. Kan. May 1, 1992) (unpublished), rev'd in part, 8 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1993).
139. Id. The government conceded at trial and on appeal that probable cause was
lacking, and therefore, the Fourth Amendment issues revolved solely around Terry-
type analysis. See Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1462. As the facts of Perdue indicate, the govern-
ment could have made a strong argument that probable cause existed, and therefore,
that a full-scale arrest was lawful.
140. Perdue, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8508, at *6-7.
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likely to elicit an incriminating response."'' But the district court's
succinct decision made clear that, in its view, only when a Terry stop
becomes an arrest must a suspect be "Mirandized"-regardless of
whether the result would be the same under pure Fifth Amendment
"custody" and "interrogation" analyses.' 42
Although this view suffers from some major analytical flaws given
the very recent expansion of Terry, 43 it is understandable how the
federal district court in Perdue could have arrived at its position given
the current state of criminal procedure jurisprudence. At the time
that the district court faced the issue in 1992, it was widely accepted,
and, in fact, it was considered common knowledge, that Miranda was
simply not implicated during Terry stops.'" Tenth Circuit case law,
which the federal district court in Kansas was bound to follow, ap-
peared to be clear on that point. 45 Even the Supreme Court as re-
cently as 1984 in Berkemer v. McCarty had stated that Terry stops are
not "subject to the dictates of Miranda.' 141
Consider also the Supreme Court's language in California v.
Beheler indicating that Miranda warnings are not required until a sus-
pect has been restrained to a "degree associated with formal
arrest."' 47 It could be argued that this language connects Miranda to
the Fourth Amendment and sets forth an analytical structure where
Miranda is not triggered until an encounter leaves the Terry realm and
becomes a full-scale Fourth Amendment arrest. In other words, be-
cause Miranda warnings, according to Beheler, are not implicated until
a detention resembles a Fourth Amendment arrest-and because
Terry stops, by definition, fall short of Fourth Amendment arrests-
Miranda warnings are not implicated during Terry stops. Thus, under
this option, the question of whether Miranda has been triggered
hinges primarily upon Fourth Amendment analysis; that is, whether
the detention is classified as a Terry stop or an arrest under Fourth
Amendment doctrine.
Of the three factors discussed in the introduction to this section, this
first option serves two of them well-the rule is rather easy for police
officers to follow, and it does not undermine law enforcement efforts
by placing undue burdens on police investigative activities. On the
other hand, privacy and civil rights suffer greatly under this option.
As the facts of Perdue and the holding of the Kansas district court
141. Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1464-65 (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301
(1980)).
142. Perdue, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8508, at *5-7.
143. The analytical flaws inherent in this view will be discussed in part III.B.
144. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., United States v. Adams, Nos. 92-6001, 92-6221, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 25791, at *5-6 (10th Cir. Oct. 5, 1992) (holding that Miranda warnings are not
necessary during Terry stops).
146. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984).
147. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam).
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clearly illustrate, if the view becomes widely adopted that Miranda is
never implicated during Terry stops-even during the new, "arrest-
like" stops-then the chance that police officers will interrogate sus-
pects at gunpoint without probable cause and without administering
the counteracting Miranda safeguards is greatly increased. Indeed, in
Perdue, the suspect was interrogated in the lying-prone position at
gunpoint without probable cause, but the district court's holding and
analysis explicitly authorized this type of police conduct. Because the
use of handcuffs and the placing of suspects in police cruisers also re-
cently have become accepted during Terry stops,148 officers also will
have broad authority to use these forms of force to elicit confessions
during Terry stops from suspects who may not be aware of their con-
stitutional rights. Additional problems with this approach will be dis-
cussed in the following sections.
B. Option Two: Miranda Applicable to Terry Stops That Become
Custodial
The second alternative is reflected in the Tenth Circuit's opinion in
United States v. Perdue.'49 On appeal from the Kansas district court,
the Tenth Circuit reversed Mr. Perdue's conviction by holding that his
incriminating statements were elicited without the required safeguards
of Miranda-despite the fact that the interrogation occurred during a
valid Terry stop. 50 The primary analytical distinction between this
option and the first option concerns the constitutional doctrine that
controls the timing of when Miranda is triggered; option one relies on
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence (i.e., the Terry stop/arrest dichot-
omy), while option two performs Fourth and Fifth Amendment analy-
ses separately and applies the Fifth Amendment definitions of
"custody" and "interrogation."
In reversing Perdue's conviction, the Tenth Circuit began its consti-
tutional analysis by scrutinizing the encounter under the Fourth
Amendment.' 5 1 The government conceded that the officers on the
scene could not have effectuated a full-scale arrest because they did
not have probable cause that the driver of the car owned the mari-
juana; therefore, the only issue was whether the officers properly exe-
cuted a valid Terry stop. 5 ' Citing the recent expansion of Terry, the
Tenth Circuit agreed with the lower court that the officers' use of
guns and their placing of Perdue face down in the dirt did not convert
the encounter into an arrest. 53 Proffering the "two-tiered" ap-
148. See supra notes 100-28 and accompanying text.
149. 8 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1993).
150. Id. at 1467.
151. For a discussion of the facts of Perdue, see the text accompanying notes 131-36.
152. Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1462. In this respect, the court found that the officers did
have the requisite reasonable suspicion to make a Terry stop. Id.
153. Ld. at 1463.
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proach,54 the court noted that the officers stationed at the perimeter
of the property had been informed that loaded guns were found in the
shed, and therefore, it was reasonable for them to use a heightened
level of force to "neutralize" any suspects that they encountered on
the property.' 55 As a result, the court found that the officers had con-
stitutionally administered a valid Terry stop.
Unlike the district court, however, the Tenth Circuit did not believe
that the constitutional inquiry ended with the Fourth Amendment.
Because the district court had allowed Fourth Amendment doctrine to
control not only the Terry stop/arrest distinction, but also the separate
issue of when the Fifth Amendment is invoked, the Tenth Circuit criti-
cized it for "merg[ing] several distinct constitutional inquiries into
one."' 5 6 Before the Tenth Circuit could turn to analyze the facts
under Fifth Amendment case law, however, it had to square its analy-
sis with existing precedent and the Supreme Court's language in
Berkemer,157 both of which dictated that Miranda warnings are simply
not required during Terry stops.' 58 The Tenth Circuit distinguished
those earlier holdings as emanating from an era when Terry stops
were far less intrusive than they are today. The court recognized that
in Berkemer-the opinion holding that Miranda warnings are not re-
quired during Terry stops-the Supreme Court was speaking only in
terms of the brief, noncoercive Terry stops typical of that time. 159 In
other words, existing precedent on the subject was, for the most part,
outdated:
The traditional view, consistent with the district court's conclusion,
is that Miranda warnings are simply not implicated in the context of
a valid Terry stop .... This view has prevailed because the typical
police-citizen encounter envisioned by the [Supreme] Court in Terry
usually involves no more than a very brief detention without the aid
of weapons or handcuffs, a few questions relating to identity and the
suspicious circumstances, and an atmosphere that is "substantially
less 'police dominated' than that surrounding the kinds of interroga-
tion at issue in Miranda."
Thus, historically, the maximum level of force permissible in a
standard Terry stop fell short of placing the suspect in "custody" for
purposes of triggering Miranda.6°
The court recognized that "[t]he last decade ... has witnessed a mul-
tifaceted expansion of Terry," particularly in terms of the amount of
force police officers are allowed to use during such detentions. 6'
154. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
155. Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1462-63.
156. Id. at 1461.
157. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 421 (1984).
158. See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
159. United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1464-66 (10th Cir. 1993).
160. Id. at 1464 (citations omitted).
161. Id.
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Given this expansion, "[o]ne cannot ignore the conclusion" that a sus-
pect subjected to a Terry stop where guns, handcuffs, or other such
forms of force are used is in the type of "'custodial' situation envi-
sioned by Miranda and its progeny. "162
Concerning the Supreme Court's language in California v.
Beheler, 63 which indicated that Miranda warnings are not required
until a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a "degree associated
with a formal arrest,"'" the Tenth Circuit noted that the pointed guns
and other measures of force used by the officers in Perdue were uses
of force that traditionally have been associated with the concept of
"arrest."' 65 Thus, in the context of the time at which it was decided,
the Beheler Court's reference to certain types of force that could trig-
ger Miranda because they restrained a suspect's freedom of action to a
degree "associated with formal arrest" was probably to handcuffs,
drawn weapons, the lying-prone position, and the placing of suspects
in police cruisers. That those measures of force are now common in
Terry stops does not change the fact that Miranda may be invoked
when they are employed. Implicit in the Tenth Circuit's analysis in
Perdue, therefore, is the idea that Beheler did not make the Fifth
Amendment dependent on Fourth Amendment doctrine; rather, the
Supreme Court in Beheler was simply making a convenient analogy to
Fourth Amendment terminology because the concepts of "custody"
and "arrest" happened to be roughly equivalent in that era."
Although it suffers from some flaws that will be discussed shortly,
the Tenth Circuit's analysis in Perdue has its strengths. First, it persua-
sively distinguishes Berkemer v. McCarty.67 Berkemer was handed
down when Terry stops were still considered brief, nonintrusive en-
counters. 68 In holding that Terry stops are not "subject to the dictates
of Miranda," it is clear that the Supreme Court was envisioning a
Terry stop as a brief encounter, without the use of handcuffs or weap-
ons, where the officer merely frisks the suspect and/or asks him a few
questions relating to his identity and the suspicious circumstances. 69
Its holding does not in any way stand for the proposition that Miranda
is inapplicable to the type of Terry stop that occurred in Perdue-the
Berkemer Court did not address that issue because the highly intrusive
Terry stops that are common today did not exist then.
162. Id.
163. 463 U.S. 1121 (1983) (per curiam).
164. Id at 1125.
165. United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1464-65 (10th Cir. 1993).
166. Id.; see also Williamson, supra note 18, at 381 (explaining that Beheler "specifi-
cally equated Miranda's concept of custody with the Fourth Amendment concept of
arrest").
167. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
168. As discussed supra, Berkemer was published in 1984, while the expansion of
Terry occurred primarily in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
169. See supra notes 95-96, 159-61 and accompanying text.
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The Tenth Circuit also did a better job of handling Beheler170 than
did the district court. As previously stated, at the time Beheler was
decided, measures of force that restrained a suspect's freedom to a
degree "associated with formal arrest" included handcuffs, the lying-
prone position, placing suspects in police cruisers, and drawn weap-
ons.171 Beheler stands only for the proposition that the use of those
measures of force is likely to trigger the need for Miranda warnings.
Furthermore, as the Tenth Circuit pointed out, the idea that a court
should look to Fourth Amendment doctrine to determine whether the
Fifth Amendment and Miranda have been triggered defies logic. As
the district court's opinion in Perdue illustrates, such a view in effect
allows the Fourth Amendment to trump the Fifth Amendment; if no
Fourth Amendment violation occurred, then a court does not perform
Fifth Amendment analysis regardless of whether the Fifth Amend-
ment was in fact violated. The Supreme Court has made clear, how-
ever, that Miranda is applicable whenever a suspect is subjected to
"custodial interrogation" and that the warnings are necessary when-
ever the policies behind the Miranda doctrine mandate its applica-
tion.' Thus, Miranda is controlled by the Fifth Amendment and the
policies that support it, not by the Fourth Amendment.
In sum, the second option holds that Miranda warnings are neces-
sary during Terry stops that become custodial in nature. This option
better protects civil liberties than does the first option because it en-
sures that the Fifth Amendment is not neglected or "trumped" where
it otherwise would apply. It also is truer to the spirit of the Miranda
doctrine and deciphers the actual meaning of the controlling Supreme
Court opinions more persuasively than does the first option.173 In ad-
dition, requiring officers to recite the Miranda safeguards during cer-
tain Terry stops does not place an undue burden on investigative
activities. Such a requirement is at most a minor inconvenience to
police officers.' 74
170. 463 U.S. 1121 (1983) (per curiam).
171. See supra notes 159-66 and accompanying text.
172. See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 435-38 (1984) (stating that the
Miranda doctrine is triggered when the policies supporting Miranda mandate its ap-
plication); Williamson, supra note 18, at 387 (same); see also Wollin, supra note 15, at
823-25 (same).
173. A recent article criticizes Perdue for extending Miranda. See Recent Cases,
Criminal Law-Exclusionary Rule-Tenth Circuit Holds Miranda Warning Applica-
ble to Terry Stops, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1831 (1994). It is clear, however, that the Tenth
Circuit's opinion in Perdue did not expand the Miranda doctrine in any sense, but
simply applied traditional Fifth Amendment analysis without allowing the Fourth
Amendment to "trump" the Fifth Amendment. The author of Tenth Circuit Holds
Miranda Warning Applicable to Terry Stops simply analyzed the conflict backwards.
Miranda has not expanded into the Terry realm; rather, the problem has been caused
by Terry's expansion into the Miranda realm. The Perdue opinion merely recognized
Terry's expansion while retaining Miranda at its previous dimensions.
174. But see id. (arguing that Perdue's requirement that police officers "Mirandize"
suspects during Terry stops that become custodial places an undue burden on law
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The major problem with this approach is its complexity, which the
Tenth Circuit did not address in Perdue. Before the expansion of
Terry, when the concepts of "arrest" and "custody" were considered
roughly equivalent, the rule was rather easy to follow. Police officers
knew that, as a general rule, Miranda warnings were not required dur-
ing Terry stops, but the warnings had to be administered when an en-
counter escalated into a full-scale arrest. After Perdue, the scenario is
not so easy. Not only must police officers determine whether they
have reasonable suspicion or probable cause and then use the appro-
priate level of force, they must also simultaneously perform Fifth
Amendment analysis and ask: Is this a custodial Terry stop or a non-
custodial Terry stop? Many more categories of encounters exist after
Perdue which police officers will have to sort through while attempting
to detain a suspect in a rapidly unfolding, potentially hostile situation.
It remains to be seen whether the structure enunciated by the Tenth
Circuit in Perdue will be manageable, or whether it will lead to more
confusion, and ultimately, more convictions being reversed because of
error by police officers.
C. Option Three: Terry Returned to its Intended Contours
Although it was apparently not considered by either the district
court or the Tenth Circuit in Perdue, the third option is rather simple:
Return the Terry doctrine to its pre-expansion dimensions, and
thereby diffuse the tension that has recently been created between
Terry and Miranda. Under this option, the resulting procedure would
be easy for police officers and courts to manage: Terry stops would,
once again, be brief, nonintrusive affairs, where police officers are
prohibited from using any "arrest-like" measure of force that might
trigger Miranda. Under this approach, Miranda would never be appli-
cable during Terry stops because such encounters would, by definition,
fall short of creating the requisite "custodial" situation.
For reasons that will become apparent as this section of the Article
progresses, it is this author's view that Terry and Miranda never
should have met. Therefore, this third option, which reverses the ex-
pansion of Terry and retracts it from the Miranda realm, offers the
best solution to the conflict. As will be discussed below, Terry's ex-
pansion should be reversed because: 1) it is contrary to relevant
Supreme Court authority, and 2) it has not been supported by persua-
sive or logical rationales.
First, Terry's recent expansion is inconsistent with Supreme Court
precedent and should be overturned on this ground alone. Recall that
enforcement efforts because it forces officers to choose between: 1) effectuating a
Terry stop and providing Miranda warnings when the encounter becomes custodial; 2)
not making the stop because the officers will be able to obtain only limited informa-
tion from a suspect that has been "Mirandized"; or 3) making the stop and applying
only minimal force so that the encounter does not implicate Miranda).
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in Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court made very clear that such deten-
tions had to be minimally intrusive.175 The Court emphasized that the
Terry exception to probable cause must be "narrowly drawn,' 1 76 and it
accordingly authorized only a stop and a "carefully limited search of
the outer clothing [of a suspect] in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault" an officer or passerby. 77 As the Terry
opinion and its subsequent interpretations by the lower federal courts
made clear, handcuffs, pointed weapons, and other intrusive measures
of force were clearly prohibited unless probable cause existed; the
only types of Terry stops deemed permissible were stop-and-frisks and
stops consisting of a few brief questions without the use of force. 178
While many of the lower federal courts have suddenly strayed from
this path in the past few years, the Supreme Court has consistently
reaffirmed the principle that the Terry doctrine is a strict and narrow
exception to the probable cause requirement. In Dunaway v. New
York, 1 79 the Court summarized its important Terry-related holdings
from 1967 through 1979:
Because Terry involved an exception to the general rule requiring
probable cause, this Court has been careful to maintain its narrow
scope. Terry itself involved only a limited, on-the-street frisk for
weapons. Two subsequent cases which applied Terry also involved
limited weapons frisks. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972)
(frisk for weapons on basis of reasonable suspicion); Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (order to get out of car is permissible
"de minimis" intrusion after car is lawfully detained for traffic viola-
tions; frisk for weapons justified after "bulge" observed in jacket).
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), applied Terry
in the special context of roving border patrols stopping automobiles
to check for illegal immigrants. The investigative stops usually con-
sumed less than a minute and involved "a brief question or two."
422 U.S. at 880. The Court stated that "[b]ecause of the limited
nature of the intrusion, stops of this sort may be justified on facts
that do not amount to the probable cause required for an arrest."180
Thus, through 1979, the Supreme Court had continued to construe
Terry narrowly and to uphold the constitutionality of Terry stops that
consisted only of frisks or a few brief questions unaccompanied by the
use of force.
In 1984, the Court revisited Terry in Berkemer v. McCarty,'8 ' the
facts of which were set forth in part II of this Article. 82 In holding
175. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 30.
178. See supra notes 65-83 and accompanying text.
179. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
180. Id. at 210-11 (footnotes omitted).
181. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
182. See supra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
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that Miranda warnings are not required during Terry stops or other
detentions analogous to Terry stops, the Court made clear that it con-
tinued to envision Terry investigations as brief, nonintrusive affairs.1 3
Indeed, it was what the Court described as the "nonthreatening" and
"noncoercive" nature of Terry stops that prompted it to hold that
"persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not 'in cus-
tody' for the purposes of Miranda."'14 In addition, although the
Supreme Court did not face Terry-related issues often during the
1980s, individual Justices reminded the lower courts from time to time
in dicta that the exception must remain limited and narrowly
drawn.'" 5 For example, in Florida v. Royer,1s6 where the Court con-
strued what it called the "limited exception" created by Terry,"s Jus-
tice Brennan stated in a concurring opinion:
The scope of a Terry-type "investigative" stop and any attendant
search must be extremely limited or the Terry exception would
"swallow the general rule that Fourth Amendment seizures [and
searches] are 'reasonable' only if based on probable cause .... In
my view, any suggestion that the Terry reasonable-suspicion stan-
dard justifies anything but the briefest of detentions or the most
limited searches finds no support in the Terry line of cases.18
Even as late as 1993, while the lower federal courts were in the pro-
cess of expanding Terry far beyond its original contours, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed its belief that the Terry exception must be strictly
construed. In Minnesota v. Dickerson,8 9 a police officer executed a
Terry-type stop-and-frisk on Mr. Dickerson who was suspected of car-
rying drugs. While patting Dickerson's outer clothing, the officer felt
a small lump in his shirt pocket. The officer then moved the lump
around through the clothing and determined that it might be a rock of
crack cocaine. He then slid his hand inside of the suspect's shirt and
retrieved a small plastic bag containing one-fifth of a gram of crack.
In affirming the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision that Dickerson's
conviction must be reversed, the United States Supreme Court held
that the officer's conduct was too intrusive for a valid Terry stop. 9
The officer "overstepped the bounds of the 'strictly circumscribed'
search for weapons allowed under Terry" when he continued to feel
and move the lump in Dickerson's shirt after concluding that it was
183. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439-40.
184. Id. at 440.
185. See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 689 (1985) (Marshall, J., con-
curring) (holding that the Terry exception must be "narrowly drawn"); Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 510-11 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that the Terry
reasonable suspicion standard only justifies "the briefest of detentions").
186. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
187. Id at 498.
188. Id. at 510-11 (Brennan, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
189. 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
190. Id. at 2138-39.
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not a weapon.191 Although this holding does not directly relate to the
issue of whether guns, handcuffs, and other "arrest-like" measures of
force may be used, the Court's broad language is instructive. The
Court reminded the lower courts that Terry stops must be "limited to
that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be
used to harm the officer or others nearby," and that any intrusion be-
yond that point "is [not] valid under Terry.' 92
Considering the strong language in these cases, it is not surprising
that the Supreme Court has never authorized the use of handcuffs, the
holding of suspects at gunpoint, or any of the other "arrest-like"
measures of force that have suddenly become popular during Terry
stops. 193 While the Court has never directly ruled on these precise
issues, dicta in several cases strongly suggests that such measures of
force do not fit within the Court's definition of a valid Terry stop. For
example, in Michigan v. Summers,194 the Court stated that "every
seizure having the essential attributes of a formal arrest[ ] is unreason-
able unless it is supported by probable cause."'"5 Although the Sum-
mers Court did not list what it considered to be the "attributes of a
formal arrest," two years earlier, in Dunaway,196 the Court had indi-
cated that drawn guns and handcuffs were the "trappings of a techni-
cal formal arrest."' 97 Thus, unless "trappings of an arrest" are not the
same as "attributes of an arrest," Dunaway and Summers together in-
dicate that drawn weapons and handcuffs are inappropriate absent
probable cause, and thus, are unlawful during Terry stops.198
In addition, the Supreme Court stated in Dunaway that "custodial
interrogation ... intrudes so severely on interests protected by the
Fourth Amendment as necessarily to trigger the traditional safeguards
191. Id. at 2138.
192. Id. at 2136.
193. The closest the Court has come in this respect was in United States v. Hensley,
469 U.S. 221 (1985), when it ruled that officers who had executed a Terry-type stop
with their guns drawn but pointed skyward did not exceed the limited bounds of
Terry. Id. at 224, 229.
194. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
195. Id. at 700.
196. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 215 (1979).
197. Id. at 215 n.17.
198. In addition, in United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1993), the Tenth
Circuit stated that drawn weapons and the lying-prone position were measures of
force "associated with formal arrest." Id. at 1464. Therefore, if one applies the lan-
guage of Summers to the facts of Perdue, the officers' conduct should have been con-
sidered unlawful because they did not have probable cause. As one commentator
notes:
Terry gave the government the right to make a temporary detention of a
suspect on less than probable cause. Its progeny suggest, however, that if
either the manner of effectuating the nonarrest detention or the investigative
means employed during the period of nonarrest detention mirror those that
lawfully could be employed only if a lawful arrest has occurred, the deten-
tion will be treated as a de facto arrest for Fourth Amendment purposes.
Williamson, supra note 18, at 403.
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against illegal arrest."'199 This language suggests that when the level of
force used by the police places a suspect in "custody," the encounter
has become, by definition, a Fourth Amendment arrest that is illegal
unless probable cause exists. As stated supra, handcuffs, pointed
guns, and the placing of suspects in police cruisers are all generally
considered to render a suspect in "custody."'  Naturally, therefore,
Dunaway stands for the proposition that these measures of force may
not be used absent probable cause.2"1
Besides contravening the letter and spirit of the Supreme Court's
teachings on the subject, the recent expansion of Terry has not been
supported by persuasive rationale. The sole justification that the
lower federal courts have offered in allowing police officers to use
guns, handcuffs, and other such measures of force is "officer
safety."'  The argument, as illustrated in the Tenth Circuit's Perdue
opinion, is that officers need to be able to use such forceful measures
to "neutralize" dangerous suspects before Terry stops commence.203
The problem with this analysis is not that officer safety is unimpor-
tant; rather, the problem is that this argument, as a matter of Supreme
Court precedent, cannot support any sort of intrusion beyond a mere
stop-and-frisk. This conclusion is mandated by the Terry opinion.2°4
In the Terry case, after finding that the officer reasonably feared that
Mr. Terry and his companions were armed and dangerous,205 the
Supreme Court recognized that "American criminals have a long tra-
dition of armed violence, and every year in this country many law en-
forcement officers are killed in the line of duty, and thousands more
are wounded."'  The Court then stated:
In view of these facts, we cannot blind ourselves to the need for
law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other prospec-
tive victims of violence in situations where they may lack probable
cause for an arrest. When an officer is justified in believing that the
individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close
range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it
would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the
power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person
is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical
harm.
199. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 216.
200. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
201. See Williamson, supra note 18, at 400 n.127 ("Dunaway, on the other hand,
emphasized the intrusive nature of the objective pursued-custodial interrogation-
as the factor that turned the detention into a de facto arrest.").
202. United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1462-63 (10th Cir. 1993) (discussing the
expansion of Terry by federal courts based solely on an "officer safety" rationale).
203. Id-
204. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23-27 (1968).
205. 1L at 28.
206. 1& at 23.
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We must still consider, however, the nature and quality of the
intrusion on individual rights which must be accepted if police of-
ficers are to be conceded the right to search for weapons in situa-
tions where probable cause to arrest for crime is lacking. Even a
limited search of the outer clothing for weapons constitutes a se-
vere, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, and
it must surely be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating
experience.
2 07
The Court then balanced the government's interest in police safety
against the public's interest in remaining free from police harassment
and reached a compromise: the "narrowly drawn" stop-and-frisk. 08
Therefore, the "officer safety" argument was fully considered by the
Supreme Court in Terry, balanced against civil liberties interests, and
deemed to support no more than a limited stop-and-frisk. The sugges-
tion that officer safety is a new variable that authorizes intrusions
above and beyond what was authorized in Terry is disingenuous and
does not comport with precedent. When police officers do not have
probable cause that a potentially dangerous person is engaging in
criminal activity, they do not have to approach the person and put
their lives in danger. As the probable cause requirement in the Fourth
Amendment dictates,0 9 in those situations, police officers should con-
tinue to investigate and keep an eye on the suspicious individual until
either probable cause arises or their suspicion is dispelled.
In sum, the recent expansion of Terry is contrary to the letter and
spirit of the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The
third option, therefore, resolves the conflict between Terry and Mi-
randa by returning the Terry doctrine to its pre-expansion contours.
One obvious advantage to this approach is that it is consistent with
Supreme Court precedent in all respects, including Terry-something
that cannot be said for the other two options. In addition, this option
would be easy for police officers and courts to manage because it does
not create a confusing, multilayered analysis as does the second op-
tion. It also does the best job of the three options of supporting civil
liberties because not only are Fifth Amendment/Miranda interests
preserved, but Fourth Amendment protections are recognized and al-
lowed to perform their intended functions. Turning to the last factor,
this option does not place an undue burden on law enforcement inter-
ests. One could argue that prohibiting officers from using highly in-
trusive types of force during Terry stops would impede their ability to
detain suspects for investigation and thus, would frustrate law en-
forcement efforts. This rule, however, was in place for many years
207. Id. at 24-25.
208. Id. at 27-30.
209. See supra note 7. The Supreme Court has made clear that the probable cause
requirement is the general rule under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Dunaway v.
New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979) (discussing probable cause as necessary to make
Fourth Amendment seizures reasonable).
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prior to Terry's unprecedented expansion, and, according to the
Supreme Court, it worked.210 In any event, when compared to the
Tenth Circuit's multilayered Perdue approach, this option's clarity and
simplicity would, in the long run, result in fewer police mistakes and
fewer convictions being overturned because of error. Any frustration
of police investigatory tactics caused by reversing Terry's uncalled-for
expansion would be counteracted by the efficiency and bright-line na-
ture of the resulting rule.
CONCLUSION
In the past few years, the lower federal courts have dramatically
increased the level of force that police officers may use during Terry
stops. This trend has thrown Fifth Amendment jurisprudence into a
state of confusion and has cast doubt on the traditional notion that
Miranda warnings are not required during Terry-type detentions.
There are three distinct options that the federal courts may invoke to
resolve this controversy. The first is demonstrated by the Kansas Dis-
trict Court's analysis in United States v. Perdue. In that case, the court
held that suspects do not have to be "Mirandized" during police de-
tentions that fall short of Fourth Amendment arrests, regardless of
whether the suspects are in "custody" or are "interrogated" by po-
lice.2 ' Although this option creates an easy rule for police officers to
follow and does not unduly burden law enforcement efforts, it sub-
stantially undermines civil liberty interests because it authorizes police
officers to interrogate suspects in highly coercive scenarios without
probable cause.
The second option is reflected in the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Per-
due, which reversed the district court's opinion, and held that Miranda
warnings are required in Terry stops that become custodial in na-
ture.21 2 While this approach avoids sacrificing civil liberties and deci-
phers the relevant Supreme Court cases more persuasively than the
first option does, it creates a complex, multilayered structure that is
contrary to the Supreme Court's insistence that criminal procedure
rules remain simple and easy to follow.
Both of these options suffer from one additional flaw: their adher-
ence to the trend of expanding Terry runs contrary to existing Fourth
Amendment precedent. The Supreme Court has continually reaf-
firmed the principle that the Terry exception to the probable cause
requirement is limited and must be narrowly drawn. The Court con-
tinues to envision Terry stops as nonintrusive police-citizen encounters
210. See supra notes 65-67, 175-201 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court
has endorsed this rule in that it has continually reaffirmed it in both holdings and
dicta.
211. United States v. Perdue, No. 91-40052-01, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8508, at *5-7
(D. Kan. May 1, 1992) (unpublished), rev'd in part, 8 F.3d 1455, 1461 (10th Cir. 1993).
212. Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1464-65.
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that do not escalate beyond a mere stop-and-frisk. Therefore, both
the district court and the Tenth Circuit in Perdue failed to focus on the
true cause of the problem: the misguided expansion of Terry. Instead
of trying to bend the Miranda doctrine to fit the new "arrest-like"
Terry stops, the courts should have more closely examined their
Fourth Amendment analyses and asked, "Has the expansion of Terry
been worth the confusion that it has caused?" and, more importantly,
"Is the trend of expanding Terry consistent with Supreme Court
precedent?"
Courts in the future should resolve the conflict by fixing what is
broken: the Terry doctrine. The third option, therefore, negates the
constitutional dilemma by returning Terry to its previous dimensions
so that it no longer crosses into the Miranda realm. This option not
only is true to the Supreme Court's teachings, but it champions civil
liberties, creates an easy rule for police officers to apply, and avoids
unduly burdening law enforcement efforts.
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